Levinas accuses the entire history of Western ontology "from Parmenides on" of being driven by the urge to bring Being under the command of the thinking self, so that the "Other" (or "Infinite") can be corralled within the horizon of the ego's own cares and possibilities.
iii This sweeping indictment permits Levinas to draw a stark contrast between two roads in Western thought: 1) an avenue originating in Athens -the egoism of ontology, with its penchant for a "totalizing" grasp of Being -and 2) a path, emanating from Jerusalem, that is less travelled by philosophers and that Levinas calls "metaphysics."
iv The heart's desire of the Jerusalemite, the metaphysician, is not to master Being but to be ethically responsible for the Other, whose very face is received as the locus of God's commandment, "Thou shalt not murder." The face is a vessel of the Torah's prophetic call to give to "the orphan, the widow, the stranger and the poor." The quality of our lives is measured, in Levinas's Judaic tradition, not by our knowledge or authenticity, but by the attention we pay to these "Others": the needy who are unneeded, whose cries are inconvenient, and whose lives may seem useless to those intent on mastering Being.
But what has Levinas's move from Being to "the Other" to do with philosophy? Doesn't pitting Jerusalem against Athens, metaphysics against ontology, also mean pitting faith against philosophy, revelation against reason? Levinas answers with a resounding "No!," contending that Judaism's message does not require submission to the texts or laws of the Jewish tradition in particular, but is immediately available to every
human being in what the human face-to-face encounter reveals on its own terms. And this encounter can be articulated philosophically.
Worldly things derive their meaning from the roles they play within a context organized around the cognitive powers and practical needs of the ego. Knowing, using and enjoying things in one's environment involve "assimilating" what is alien to "the Same." The Other, however, has absolute meaning "all by himself," prior to how he fits into the ego's grasp of Being. When the face is encountered for what it is, the inexhaustibility of what it signifies -the Other -is welcomed as a Good-in-itself for whom I am responsible.
This transcendent Good is acknowledged in its "Infinity," as coming from "beyond Being," neither in a Platonic intellectual intuition nor in a Heideggerian mood of anxiety, but in the feeling of shame that attests to the awakening of one's conscience before the Other. The Other is higher than I am because the first word of the face is "Thou shalt not murder." It is an order. There is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me. However, at the same time the face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all. I, whoever I may be, as the "first person," I am he who finds the resources to respond to the call. objective Good-in-itself, and so no basis for ethical responsibility.
Consequently, the very possibility of ethics demands reference to a supernatural Good: a meaning that reveals itself from "beyond Being" because it requires one to be able to sacrifice one's interests -and even one's life -for the sake of the Other. Regardless of whether one identifies the Other's face as the trace of God, one is responding to a supernatural summons when one suppresses nature in order to welcome one's neighbor.
Our bodies sets the stage for our being able to transcend our nature and condemn "the survival of the fittest" in the name of "Shalom!" And paradoxically, we reveal our spirituality most fundamentally by tending to the material needs of others: the needs of life itself.
Levinas agrees that the ethical message he discerns within the I/You encounter is perhaps best exemplified by Jesus's selfless lovingkindness. But he interprets the Gospels as conveying the same basic lesson that was already present in the Prophets' injunction to
give to "the orphan, the widow, the stranger and the poor." Still, Levinas's emphasis on agape -one's exclusive, self-sacrificing exposure to the particular Other one happens to face -seems to conflict with the Prophets' ideal of justice: a moral principle that requires that all Others, and even oneself, as "the Other of Others," be respected equally.
Levinas concedes that love needs justice because the "third parties" who stand outside the immediacy of the I/You encounter are also one's neighbors. Justice demands that incomparables be compared: that the unique Other to whom one is absolutely devoted be placed within the wider human community and be acknowledged as "only one among others." Justice requires that the conscientious self step back from the immediacy of the one-for-another and adopt a posture of neutrality: treating everyone as having equal rights. Levinas acknowedges that justice is recommended by the Torah itself, but argues that ethical priority lies in mercy (rahamim): simple acts of caring. Long before the recently celebrated debate between Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan over the relative importance of justice and care, the Judaic tradition has known that a concern with justice's "abstract order of rules" too easily degenerates into an "ideological rationalism"
that is forgetful of the unique Other who needs a helping hand. for His law is revealed through the face of the Other. To compensate for His separation from us, God has put Torah into his childrens' hands, and, writes Levinas, "one is justified in loving Torah even more than God." It is the glory of Judaism, according to Levinas, to welcome a God who does not want to possess us but who wants us to be responsible so that our work has real importance. "To veil His face in order to demand everything from man": this, remarks Levinas, is "an austere humanism bound to a difficult adoration." xiii Finally, Levinas's is a personal God who singles each of us out for responsibility. We stand alone not, as Heidegger would have it, before our own death, but in the irreplaceable burden we bear for those whose lives embody a Good-in-itself that absolutely transcends our own life and death.
Levinas brings all humans into the orbit of Judaic experience because the I/You encounter, constitutive of being a human agent, bears pre-philosophical and even pretextual testimony to the Judaic understanding of the relationship between humanity and
God. "Thou shalt not murder" is, as Levinas puts it, "a Saying that is prior to any Said":
an imperative addressed to the singular individual, through the face of the Other, that precedes all products of tradition or reflection, including ontological accounts of the meaning of Being. xiv Though commandment takes possession of the ego before one has time to evaluate it reflectively and autonomously, our reason can articulate the meaning of this experience by a phenomenological description of the revelation implicit in the face-to-face encounter. In this regard, then, faith is not alien to philosophy, revelation not immune to reason.
Against Heidegger in particular, who represents the apotheosis of the egoism of ontology, Levinas uses phenomenology to establish that no anxious assertion of freedom can excuse a shameful failure of ethical responsibility, no appeal to authenticity can override the commandment not to murder, and that any philosophy, like Heidegger's, that cannot set this fundamental limit is complicit in the Nazis' crime against the Absolute.
II
At last I return to the questions that my thoughtful students and colleagues inevitably pose when they become acquainted with Levinas's ideas: in particular, his claim that I "owe everything" not to my parents, spouse, children or community -but to strangers, and even persecutors. Everyone agrees that Levinas's philosophy is sublime.
But is it true? Does it describe our human reality, or rather express a fantasy, perhaps fuelled by resentment that, given human nature, we cannot be as noble as Levinas would Hobbes to conclude that the fight against an egoistic conception of human nature -and rational support for the virtue of respecting, and even promoting, the interests of other human beings -lies at the heart of Western ontology.
Levinas seems to argue that anything short of "Jerusalem's" insistence on the asymmetry of the I/You relationship and the priority of Other over self must end up giving priority to self over Other. If so, he seems to overlook a major strand of the ethical tradition springing from Athens: humanism, born of a regard for the dignity and moral equality of all human beings, rooted in our shared capacity for reason. When my students and colleagues object to Levinas, they usually articulate a humanistic perspective of a roughly Kantian variety that forbids us from using one another solely as means, and so condemns murder. Because this perspective comprises so much of contemporary moral commonsense, it is worth spelling it out in order to identify what Levinas has against it.
Why does Levinas consider rationalistic humanism, in spite of its insistence on the moral equality of all persons, to be a species of egoism incapable of providing us with ethical protection against our murderous impulses?
On the Kantian view our primary responsibilities to others are negative: do not harm or inflict evil upon anyone. Our positive reponsibilities to help others in need are more qualified: do good -or prevent or repair evil -sometimes. Our resources to help are limited. Because 'ought' implies 'can,' there is no obligation to help everyone. One has a positive duty to help strangers only in special cases and when the cost to one's own welfare is "within reason." Ordinary morality amounts to limiting norms, mostly negative, which we may not violate, but within which we may live such a life as we deem good for ourselves. A saint who dedicates his entire life to helping strangers may be an object of our admiration, but he is not emulated from the perspective of ordinary morality, for a saintly life requires the sacrifice of too many of the goods that make most peoples' lives worth living.
xv Within the framework of ordinary morality, Bernard Williams has defined the conditions of "the moral principle of rescue" as follows:
IF 1) V ("Victim") is in peril, and
2) H ("Helper") is "saliently related" to V's peril, and
3) H can hope to offer effective aid to V, and 4) the cost to H is not unreasonably high, THEN H ought to help V.
xvi When the rescuer goes above and beyond the call of duty and risks his life to save a stranger, the stranger does not have a right to be helped and the rescuer has acted in a "supererogatory" manner. Other bystanders cannot be faulted as if they behaved unconscienably by refusing to expose themselves to similar dangers.
Williams points out that the expectation of rescue is further diminished when the victim is in peril because of the hostility of a third party, P ("Persecutor"). In "the hostility case," the cost to H of helping poor V is probably too high. At best, it is only reasonable to expect a group to come to the victim's aid. But even here there are problems: 1) the coordination problem -who will assume the greatest risk by daring to take the lead? -and 2) the authorization problem: is H entitled to confront the persecutor, even if he is able to do so? Perhaps this is a job for the police. Of course when the persecutor is himself a representative of the police, the risk to would-be rescuers becomes unbearable.
Though ordinary morality precludes one's becoming a murderer, it rarifies the conditions under which one has a duty to become a rescuer. And Kant is notorious for going further than this. Should the persecutor inquire as to the whereabouts of his wouldbe victim, a moral agent, according to Kant, should not lie in order to protect the victim, but should only make sure that he himself does not become a murderer. Most advocates of ordinary "Kantian" morality would not go as far as Kant on this score because the vast majority of us take the duty to tell the truth to be less stringent than the duty to protect the innocent. But when one must lie to the police in order to save the innocent, the would-be liar is likely to perceive this act as being as dangerous as positively rescuing the victim, and so it may seem unreasonable to expect of him that he ought to protect the innocent by lying. The line between moral principle and collaboration has become fine indeed.
III
This reflection on the place of rescue within ordinary "Kantian" morality gets us to the heart of Levinas's suspicion that a kind of "egoism" lurks within the tradition of Levinas calls attention to the gulf between 1) a theory of justice that can ground the impartial judgment that murder is wrong because each of us is only "one among others" and 2) an existential perspective from which the individual feels responsible to do what he can to stop the horror of murder, even at great cost to himself, because the particular Other he faces comes before himself. Although ordinary "Kantian" morality gives us a basis for condemning genocide, it is full of excuses when it comes to the individual's opportunity to be a rescuer: to serve "the orphan, the widow, the stranger and the poor," those who do not have the power to enforce protection by the social contract.
Relative to the "might makes right" naturalism of the unabashedly egoistic strand of Western ethics -represented by Thrasymachus and Hobbes -Kantian morality proudly presents itself as being "unnatural" -or of pointing to a higher and more demanding potential for human nature than that of gratifying our appetites. What we lose from the perspective of our selfish inclinations, we gain beyond measure from the standpoint of individuals had passed this test: if they had not only been able to acknowledge the face of the Other beyond the stereotypes imposed by Nazi ideology, but also been willing to jeopardize their own comfort and even survival for these Others in spite of the fact that shutting them out conformed with Nazi justice. But it was only natural to ask: Why should I take it upon myself to break the law and thereby risk my family's safety in order to save a public enemy whom it is acceptable, even required, to regard with contempt?
When I choose to protect myself rather than expose myself for the Other's sake, I
attest to the priority my life has over his when the chips are down. Egoism rears its head when I put my own desire to be (conatus essendi) before his and prove myself to be unwilling to substitute my life for his. Levinas does not deny the natural goodness of life itself, for "the Other's material needs are my spiritual needs," and my being-for-the-Other would be no spiritual achievement if my life were no good to me. Although you and I share in this goodness, each does so in an absolute -and ultimately non-relational -way. I compromise my responsibility for the absolute Good-in-itself of your life unless I am willing to risk my life in order to save yours.
The "bad Samaritan" cannot excuse himself by lamenting, "But justice doesn't require us to risk everything for the sake of mere strangers." According to Levinas, conscience does not let us off the hook so easily, but haunts us with the reminder that we should be ashamed of ourselves if the blood of innocents is on our hands. It is not enough to refrain from committing murder if one has failed to be one's brother's keeper.
Levinas suspends the universal not, as in Kierkegaard, for the sake of a religious particularity at odds with the ethical, but for the sake of an ethical imperative higher than the mere universality of justice: a commandment emanating from the particular, fragile, incomparably valuable life of an Other. What Levinas calls "substitution" goes beyond the reciprocity of ordinary morality in the direction of the particular Other whose welfare and life I may usurp when I merely observe my negative duty not to murder -and before whom I may have no right when it's either his life or mine. The real meaning of "Thou shalt not murder" is "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," and this, Levinas says, is "an odd recommendation for an existence summoned to live at all costs." xvii IV But Levinas's demanding ethics of rescue -of good Samaritanism -not only conflicts with our ordinary "Kantian" morality that emphasizes our negative duties. The radical implications of Levinas's ethics are also resisted by advocates of the agape (or neighbor-love) tradition who think that Levinas simply goes too far over to the Other at the expense the integrity of the self.
In his account of the agape tradition, John Davenport, drawing on the work of Gene Outtka, agrees that there is some truth in Levinas's claim that "the intersubjective relation is non-symmetrical," and this grain of truth is essential to any ethics of neighborlove. xviii First, our most basic responsibility to Others does not arise from our own volitional acts. The human self emerges in the first place only as responsive to the transcendence of the Other in his own right. Personal existence opens up in the experience of non-self-ownership and the passions to which we are susceptible in virtue of being beyond ourselves. Freedom, as the capacity to choose between good and evil, is already invested with responsibility. Second, our most basic responsibility is not conditioned upon the Other's respecting or caring for us in return, but requires reaching out even without a guarantee of mutuality.
At this point, however, Davenport distinguishes between two main strands of the agape tradition. The self-renunciatory strand, with which Davenport identifies Levinas, sees neighbor-love as requiring total self-sacrifice: an altruism that disallows any concern about the self's own well-being. The reconciliatory strand, by contrast, situates neighborlove in an unstable middle-ground between 1) the ascetic demand for total selfrenunciation and 2) the formal symmetry of self-interested parties contracting for mutual advantage.
Davenport contends that only the reconciliatory strand is credible, for reciprocity is not necessarily narcissistic, and it has a role to play within agape itself. The persecutor must be resisted in the name of "the other Others" -and "even myself" -to whom his face refers. Still, Levinas insists that justice receives its inspiration from the effort to attend to the individual. The need to make and impose impartial political and legal judgments should not lead us to "forget the uniqueness of the other person,"
presumably even the persecutor, "whose right is, after all, at the origin of rights, yet always a new calling." The real implication of Davenport's claim that reciprocity rooted in self-love is compatible with agape may well be the likelihood that a person of integrity will be so attached to his own kith and kin that he will fail the acid test of responsibility. One senses that Davenport's "reconciliation" may really be a way of protecting the ordinary "Kantian" virtues -on the grounds that good Samaritanism as a way of living would leave one with a decentered and disintegrated self. But it is unclear when aversion to the risk of selfsacrifice in the name of balancing neighbor-love and self-love becomes an excuse: a rationalization for slamming the door on "the orphan, the widow, the stranger and the poor." Davenport's reconcilatory agapeism verges on becoming so watered down that one can scarcely imagine a cause for which one would jeopardize the so-called "integrity" of the self, centered as it is on loved ones to whom I have prior responsibilities by virtue of their already being part of my social world.
V
In his sublime sermon, "On Being a Good Neighbor," Martin Luther King, Jr.
reminds us that the "neighbor" in the parable of the Good Samaritan is "anyone who lies at life's roadside." xxi What makes the Good Samaritan a paragon of neighborly virtue is that "concern for others is the first law of his life." King describes this altruism as being universal, excessive and dangerous. It is "universal" because it opens its arms to all human beings, regardless of the accidents of race, religion, or nationality. It is "dangerous" because it requires that one risk one's position, prestige and life -and even the comfort and safety of one's own family -for the sake of strangers. It is "excessive"
because it demands that one show compassion and not mere pity: that one walk the extra mile with the victim, not merely make sure someone else gets him what he needs. Perhaps this is the only ethics that can inoculate us against the moral collapse that accompanies genocide. But is human nature up to the task?
Levinas reminds us that a conscience awake to the needs of "anyone who lies at life's roadside" knows no bounds. For it is not enough even to substitute oneself for those one happens to encounter; perhaps one is hiding behind egoism by not going out of one's way to seek out the Other. We are being dishonest if we do not admit that the saint embodies the regulative ideal of the ethical life -and that any way of living short of saintliness should be haunted by shame. The commandment to "love thy neighbor" is, as
Levinas concedes, not recommended for those who take their own lives too seriously.
But we are equally haunted by another Jew, Sigmund Freud, who reminds us:
"The commandment is impossible to fulfill; such an enormous inflation of love can only lower its value, not get rid of the difficulty." xxii We cannot but ask whether the words of this "atheist" are closer to Jewish teaching than those of the Talmudic master, Emmanuel
Levinas. 
